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Racist comments made by some youths have spawned many reactions from Singaporeans. This 
presents another interesting issue: Do these reactions themselves evince the kind of intolerance of a 
diversity of opinions which they are attacking? When and how can we differ without being intolerant 
and disrespectful? 
This was a point raised by Mr Goh Wen Zhong in his column on Monday's YouthInk page in this 
newspaper. Of the attack with 'derogatory language and a lack of respect for the opinions of the writer' 
of certain racist comments, he wrote: 'There must be a difference between 'I do not agree with you' 
and 'You are wrong'. I study in Britain, where freedom of speech and expression prevail, and there is a 
corresponding maturity in the way issues are debated. The true mark of a developed society lies in the 
ability of its citizens to keep an open mind and respect each other's views.' 
If Mr Goh means to question the use of derogatory language, he makes an important point about the 
ethics of discourse. 
If, however, he is suggesting that the language of right and wrong is in itself the hallmark of 
intolerance and is always inappropriate in debate, there appears to be a performative inconsistency in 
his act of writing the column to persuade us of the 'wrongness' of some of our reactions. His column 
seems to say to us: 'You are wrong to say 'you are wrong', for you cannot say 'you are wrong'.' His act 
of writing thus defeats the very point he is writing to make. 
What may explain the aversion of someone like Mr Goh to the language of right and wrong? Such 
language, with its implicit (if not explicit) truth claim, has become somewhat unfashionable in 
postmodern discourse, particularly with the fear of moral fundamentalism. 
At first blush, it seems that when someone says something is his personal opinion, discourse is 'safe' 
because his opinion ranks no higher than ours, whereas if he puts forth an opinion without such 
qualification and uses the language of right and wrong, he is being intolerant. Is this the case? In 
reality, one cannot avoid a truth claim in all areas of discourse, though one can be in the process of 
discovering the truth and hence prefer to put forth a tentative conclusion. 
Morality is the classic example of one such area. Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin helpfully 
distinguishes 'ice-cream opinions' (as to whether chocolate ice-cream is the best-tasting) from moral 
judgment. For example, in relation to the moral question of whether slavery is unjust, one might 
borrow Dworkin's ideas about the groups of people who might deny that slavery is unjust to help us 
understand what is at stake. 
The first group comprises the fascists who believe there is nothing wrong with slavery and that some 
people deserve to be slaves. They do not deny that moral opinions may be objectively right or wrong. 
We immediately think fascists are horrible persons for holding such a view, but fascists do not deny 
they are contending with us - who hold the diametrically opposed view (that slavery is unjust) - within 
the enterprise of morality. We can challenge them and when we do so, we are trying to find out which 
of our opinions is the more correct one by reference to an objective standard which we may be trying 
to figure out. We may show them their views are unviable, for example, when we invoke the golden 
rule or Kantian categorical imperative against them and require them to put themselves in the shoes of 
someone being made a slave. 
The second are the sceptical philosophers who deny that 'slavery is really unjust' because they believe 
all moral judgments are a matter of one's subjective opinion and deny that such judgment can be 
really or objectively true. With such a person, it is not possible to discourse about whose judgment 
better approximates truth. He does not believe that either his judgment or yours can be correct, 
because he does not believe any standard of correctness exists. 
This categorisation helps us understand several points. 
First, it seems more acceptable to be a sceptical philosopher than a fascist when one holds morally 
repugnant views. It is easier to excuse the racist attitude of a young person, for example, by saying 
that it is just his personal opinion, which he is entitled to hold, especially since liberalism is now in 
vogue and each person must be allowed to have a view, however absurd. 
If, on the other hand, one realises that the view is held with a truth claim (as in the first category), the 
view becomes more troubling. 
However, what is the practical difference between a young person being a racist in his personal 
subjective opinion (second category) and believing that racism is all right as a matter of truth (first 
category)? Either way, left unchecked, he is likely to act on his belief. To my mind, if he were to 
understand the objectivity of values and his own truth claims, he would be presented with the need to 
justify his views and become more circumspect about them. 
Second, those who claim to be sceptical philosophers of the second category rarely live up to their 
claim. More often than not, they try to persuade us that their view is better. 
While 'better' is on its face different from an approximation of correctness or truth, it connotes the 
implicit acknowledgment of a standard - a guide by which we know one view is better than another. 
What is this standard if it is not a reference to values 'outside' of the persons involved in the 
discourse? Non-sceptics simply refer to them as 'objective values'. 
Acknowledging that some views may be wrong and others right is not a mark of immaturity, 
intolerance, disrespect or ill-will. It only compels one to take discourse and freedom of speech more 
seriously. 
 
